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Abstract 
Control over means of violence and protection emerge as crucial in much research on corrup-
tion in non-South Asian contexts. In the Indian context, however, we still know little about the 
systems of organised violence that sustain the entanglement of crime, capital and democratic 
politics. This timely comparative ethnographic piece explores two different manifestations of 
what our informants identify as “Mafia Raj” (“rule by mafia”) across North India (Uttar Pra-
desh and Punjab). Drawing on analytical concepts developed in the literature on bossism and 
“mafias”, we explore protection and racketeering as central statecraft repertoires of muscular 
styles of governance in the region. We show how a predatory economy together with structures 
of inter- and intra-party political competition generate the demand for and the imposition of 
unofficial and illegal protection and shape different manifestations of Mafia Raj. In doing so, 
the paper aims to contribute to debates on the relationship between states and illegalities in 
and beyond South Asia. 
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Introduction 
“There is no law and order—we live in chaos—in the ‘goonda Raj’ [rule by gangsters]—but 
crime is very organised! It is the only organised thing in Uttar Pradesh”. (A joke currently 
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circulating in UP) 
 
“We all want to go abroad because there is no law and order here, everything goes, you can do 
anything so long as you have the right connections and money, it is goonda Raj like Bihar under 
Laloo Yadav Prasad except that we are more educated than the Biharis.” (Quote from a Jat Sikh 
interviewee) 
 
The state of Uttar Pradesh, located in the Hindi heartland, is one of the most backward in India 
in terms of socioeconomic conditions. However, since the late 19th Century, the state has been 
the nerve centre of Indian politics. Uttar Pradesh controls one sixth of the Indian Parliament 
and, therefore, occupies a central position in the country’s politics. Today, more than 200 mil-
lion people live in the state, a fifth of which are Muslim. The rest are mostly Hindu, and divided 
broadly between three mutually antagonistic caste groups: the upper-caste Brahmins and 
Thakurs; the lower-caste Dalits; and the “other backward classes”, such as the Yadavs. Western 
Uttar Pradesh is widely known for its endemic violence and criminality (Brass, 1997), for being 
culturally shaped by the “macho” ethos of its dominant castes, for being marred by communal-
ism and caste-based conflicts, and finally by poverty and underdevelopment (Jeffrey et al., 
2014). Besides its national political importance, Uttar Pradesh is the site where lower castes 
appear to be most visibly challenging upper-caste political domination.  
 The Punjab, on the other hand, ranks amongst India’s most developed and prosperous 
states. It was one of the first Indian states where the Green Revolution was implemented, and 
one of the first in which all villages obtained roads and electrical connections. With a popula-
tion of around 27 million—roughly divided into urban Hindu trading castes, rural Jat Sikhs, 
and scheduled castes—the Punjab carries much less weight in Indian national politics than 
Uttar Pradesh. Nevertheless the state arguably wields influence far beyond its numbers thanks 
to a prosperous business community spread across India, Europe and North America. In 1992, 
following a decade of violent insurgency and counter-insurgency in which some militants from 
within the state’s Sikh majority demanded independence from India, Punjab entered a period 
of relative peace in which communal issues receded into the background. Political agendas 
came to be dominated by development and growth. In practice, beyond the pro-business rhet-
oric, this move is widely reported to have coincided with the rise to a tight nexus between 
business, politics and crime. Despite different political histories and distinct socio-economic 
and religious makeups, both Uttar Pradesh and the Punjab have been described as being under 
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the rule of gangsters (goondas) and “mafias”.1  
 In this article, we seek to shed more light on the systematic links between bosses, party 
machines and “criminals”.2 Crucially, we illustrate key differences in the way in which protec-
tion rackets are organised in these two sites, and argue that these different forms of organisation 
reflect different patterns of Mafia Raj (rule by mafia). We show that the ways racketeers rule 
within (or in collaboration with) party machines varies according to local patterns of political 
competition and according to the cultures of violence and discipline of local party machines. 
We argue that the consolidation of police power during Punjab’s brutal counterinsurgency, 
combined with a disciplined ruling party machine, have given rise to a more centralised form 
of racketeering than in Uttar Pradesh. Moreover, in the post-insurgency period, we find that 
two-party competition in Punjab correlates with more muted levels of communal and caste-
based conflict than in Uttar Pradesh, and hence we argue, with less demand for protection on 
the basis of communal identities. Western Uttar Pradesh has what we call a “competitive Mafia 
Raj” in which a lively multi-party system combined with the ruling Samajwadi Party’s lack of 
party discipline produce what is locally perceived as disorder. By contrast Punjab has “a mo-
nopolistic Mafia Raj” in which a two-party system combined with the ruling Shiromani Akali 
Dal’s tight party discipline produces a sometimes equally violent but more ordered and author-
itarian form of “Mafia Raj”.  
 Throughout the text we use the popular terms “Mafia Raj” and “Goonda Raj” (rule by 
                                                          
1 Research for this paper has been conducted within the framework of the research programme “Democratic Cul-
tures” (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/democratic-cultures), which is currently exploring the overlap between criminal cul-
tures and politics across India, Bangladesh and Pakistan (funded by following grants: ERC-AIMSA/284080 and 
ESRC-ES/I036702/1). Ethnographic data has been collected by direct observation, conversations and interviews 
in a provincial town in Western Uttar Pradesh and in Central Punjab during 12 months of fieldwork between 
March 2012 and June 2014. Throughout the text we omitted names and/or used pseudonymous and obscured 
localities. The authors share equal responsibility for the paper and are listed in alphabetical order.  
2 On party machine and bossism, see Scott (1969), Migdal (1988); on Italy and Russia, see Chubb (1996); on East 
Asia, see Sidel (1999); on Indonesia, see Wilson (2015); and on India, see Weiner (1963). 
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gangsters) as descriptive concepts that articulate particular local visions of the relations be-
tween state, capital, crime and the individual.3 “Mafia Raj” is a system of political and eco-
nomic governance in which politics, money and crime have developed symbiotic relations.4 
These “regimes” echo Tilly’s (1985:169) placement of “banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, po-
licing, and war-making on the same continuum”, defining states as “quintessential protection 
rackets with the advantage of legitimacy”. Under “Mafia Raj”, mafia-like bosses claim for 
themselves the rights to discipline and punish, protect, tax and represent local populations. 
More recently, criminologists and sociologists have emphasised how such “mafias” should be 
studied as modes of politico-economic governance, rather than as discrete criminal organisa-
tions (see Varese, 2011; Paoli, 2004). According to the Italian sociologist Armao (2015:3), 
when a structured and permanent group of individuals who use violence to make money 
through criminal activities meets politics, it gives rise to a third type of system called “mafia”. 
Armao has recently conceptualised such mafia-like systems of governance as “mafia-owned 
democracies” and placed them within the globalised patterns of “criminal neoliberalism” that 
have emerged since the 1980s. “Mafia-owned democracies” such as both Italy and Mexico, he 
argues, are established democracies in which professional gangsters and their organisations are 
connected to, and partially control, both political and economic power. As gangsters further 
entrench their position, Mafiosi may increasingly assume both the political leadership and con-
trol over the economic and financial resources of the state. Formal democracy often fails to 
prevent this from happening.  
 “Mafia-owned-democracies” (and their South Asia manifestations: “Mafia Raj”) are 
thus systems of governance where “(even) the official is illegal” and where nested criminal 
“official” actors replace the “state” as the privileged partners of capitalism (see Gayer, 
                                                          
3  For explorations of the growing nexus between crime and politics in India, see Brass (1997), Jaffrelot 
(2002), Hansen (2001, 2005), Manor (2007), Michelutti (2008), Jeffrey (2010), Vaishnav (2011), Berenschot 
(2011, 2014), Gill (2012), Witsoe (2009), Gooptu (2007) and Sanchez (2015). 
4  The term and concept of “mafia” has been long debated. It has been studied purely as economic activity 
and as “enterprise syndicate” (Blok, 1972); “mafia enterprise” (Arlacci, 1993); and mafia as a protection industry 
(Gambetta, 1988; Varese, 2001). Tilly (1985) has instead highlighted the relation between mafia and political sov-
ereignty by introducing the very interesting notion that organised crime can be compared to both war-making and 
state-making (see also Volkov, 2002). See, also Santoro (2011) for a discussion of “Mafia” becoming a folk concept. 
5 
2014:39). The term “mafia-owned democracy” might be applied to a political system as a 
whole or to sub-systems within it. It may apply to a particular area or to particular populations, 
and so we can have “pockets” of “mafia-owned democracy”. Crucially, such systems of gov-
ernance should be seen as effectively “comprehensive and efficient manifestation of modernity, 
and one possible way of interpreting politics in times of globalisation” (Armao, 2015:4) and 
not as exotic oriental exceptions. India is yet another established democracy in which intense 
electoral competition combined with predatory forms of capitalism is producing pockets of 
“mafia-owned democracy” run and controlled by elected “gangster politicians”.  
 Across our two sites (but not only in those locations) politics is increasingly seen as the 
most effective means to improve business opportunities and prosper.5 Crucially, the transition 
from business and crime to official politics has become an obvious career path for many ambi-
tious individuals across India. Political parties select “criminals” because they can self-finance, 
and because they can offer expertise in voter intimidation and violence (Wilkinson, 2004; 
Manor, 2007). According to Vaishnav (2011), candidates with criminal indictments are twice 
as likely to win elections if compared with their law-abiding counterparts. The pioneering work 
by Barbara Harriss-White (2003:7) illustrates how systems of “Mafia Raj” “increasingly serve 
private accumulation: a nexus in which politicians, officials, criminals, and businessmen and 
(their often poor and dependent) ‘runners’ and fixers are bound together in a mutually protec-
tive embrace.” Unitary state sovereignty, never complete, is being challenged by the prolifera-
tion of private protection services. In a similar fashion, Alpa Shah (2006) has been drawing 
attention to “markets of protection” exploring the continuities between state and “terrorist” and 
insurgent groups (in this case, the Maoists in Jharkhand).6 Building on these comparative in-
sights, we use “mafia-owned democracy” as an analytical concept to compare different mani-
festations of “Mafia Raj”. Our ethnographic focus is on what we argue is the central statecraft 
tool of such of such regimes’ protection/rackets and explores the unexpected complicities and 
                                                          
5  We describe further pockets of ‘Mafia Raj’ across South Asia and the importance of the figure of the 
boss as a protector/extortionist in Michelutti et al (n.d). 
6  In the context of Africa there is an emerging literature which explores ‘market of protection’ 
and mafia-like type of sovereignties in conflict zones, see for example Raeymaekers (2010). For an 
excellent review of this literature see Hoffman and Kirk (2013). 
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opportunistic partnerships that it generates. As Tilly (1985:170–171) famously pointed out, 
“Which image the word ‘protection’ brings to mind depends mainly on our assessment of the 
reality and externality of the threat. Someone who produces both the danger and, at a price, the 
shield against it is a racketeer. Someone who provides a needed shield but has little control 
over the danger’s appearance qualifies as a legitimate protector, especially if his price is no 
higher than that of his competitors.” Thus, in some cases, protection may be perceived “as 
socially permitted, encouraged or enjoyed as a moral right or duty” (Scheper-Hughes and Bour-
gois. 2004:5), while in others it may be perceived as exploitative. The paper shows ethnograph-
ically how local party machine bosses rule (or attempt to rule) over the trade, imposition or 
even gifts of “protection”.  
 
“Violent protectors” and cultures of enforcement  
In our analysis, we characterise bosses as close to Mafiosi, defined, following Blok, Sidel and 
Volkov, as “entrepreneurs who use private, formally unlicensed violence as a means of social 
control and economic accumulation”.7 Bosses “protect” (control and run) neighbourhoods, 
markets, business groups and political parties. They are often the source of violence and the 
provider of protection from the violence they produce. Crucially, the “Mafia Raj” systems of 
governance of which they are part, are linked to an increasingly predatory and exploitative 
economy. Our fieldwork was conducted in from one tehsil in the Punjab and another in Western 
UP.8 In contemporary India, these are settings where old divides between village and town and 
rural and urban are increasingly disappearing. The protagonists of this paper operate across the 
rural–urban divide and live in the urbanising mega regions that have emerged on the North 
Indian plains. They live in middle India (Harriss-White, 2015), a place of small towns and peri-
urban villages, and booming economies.  
 Both our settings have undergone tremendous economic changes over the past 15 years. 
Crucially, both settings have witnessed a construction boom and skyrocketing real estate prices, 
but also the emergence of a variety of new businesses and industries. In both sites, this has led 
                                                          
7  Sidel (1999:71-72). In so far as our protagonists overlap with the states they resemble not so much 
Hobsbawm’s social bandits, but rather what Blok calls mafia. Blok (1972); Volkov (2002). 
8  A tehsil is an administration headquarter located in a town or city and often covers a number of smaller 
adjacent towns and villages. 
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to an intense scramble for real estate, but also for opportunities to control booming drug, oil, 
sand, water and quarry businesses. It is in this socio-cultural and economic environment that a 
number of political bosses—at all levels, from the panchayat through to the National Assem-
bly—increasingly gain and maintain their power through their activities as violent protectors. 
Protection and extortion are particularly attractive avenues to power and riches because, as 
Paoli (2004) argues, they do not require high initial investments, carry low managing costs, 
and are relatively low-risk investments, particularly where state protection is unreliable or in-
adequate. In a world where money increasingly determines success in life and becoming rich 
and becoming rich quickly is the ethos, industries such as extortion become appealing careers 
paths for working class youth whose manual and industrial work has been economically and 
socially devalued by economic liberalisation (Gooptu, 2007). Extortion provides quick and 
immediate monetary rewards.9  
 In the region, the ideal of a strong, “wild” and dangerous boss shapes criminal political 
cultures. An old repertoire of tropes of honour, kingly leadership and heroism that valorise 
“criminal heroes” feed into the value placed on toughness and physical strength. For example, 
in the area under study enforcement is one of the constitutive elements used to define the iden-
tity of particular social groups—such as Rajputs, Yadavs and Jats—who describe themselves 
as natural protectors and use violence and coercion to maintain caste dominance hierarchies 
and enduring patriarchal structures. 10 Thakur Dabang and Gurbhachan Singh, the two main 
protectors (and aggressors) of our story both belong to “martial castes”—the first is a Rajput 
and the second a Jat Sikh—whose corporate identities are often defined by their willingness 
and ability to use force. The reputation of members of these castes as protectors and enforcers 
originates in their traditional role as rulers and landlords—or as the henchmen of landlords—
                                                          
9  For a detail discussion of the impact of “muscular economics” and criminal enterprises on the production 
of “Mafia Raj”, see Michelutti et al. (2016).  
 
10  See Michelutti (2014a), who maps out the chains of protection (and violence or threats of violence) that 
run through family life (by investigating land grabbing within “the family” and murders among relatives), vil-
lage/mohalla life, business and economic activities and “the political”.  
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who needed martial skills in order to protect their land, enforce caste hierarchies, and to subju-
gate but also “protect” labourers (see Breman, 1974), and in the case of the Sikhs, their histor-
ically persecuted religious minority. This led the British to classify Jats, Rajputs and a variety 
of different castes, including the Yadavs, as martial castes. Rajputs and Yadavs in Western UP, 
and semi-Rajput castes like Jats in the Punjab, still describe themselves as natural protectors 
and as the sole founts of legitimate justice (“We have justice in the blood,” say the Rajputs in 
UP). They frequently contrast themselves with members of the trading and lower castes who 
they view as timid and weak. Many of our informants pointed out that young male Rajputs and 
Jats are hot-headed and prone to violence. With respect to Rajputs, one informant in UP 
claimed that, “They do not want to work, even if they don’t have enough land to sustain their 
families … they still think that their occupation is to go to war, to fight, to govern or to do 
sports. Basically, they think that they can earn money without working—just by mastering 
force and intimidation” (Sunita Sisodia, 37 years old, police constable). The same was widely 
held to be true of the rich Jat Sikh cultivators who became involved in politics. Thus, in both 
settings violent self-driven and profit-driven sovereign acts are embedded in re-casted caste-
based traditions and models of authority. Today, the archetype of the brave, semi-divine patron 
is as widespread as ever (Michelutti, 2014b). However, the rhetoric of virtuous protection often 
hides a darker reality whereby political and economic allegiances are sustained through the 
stick, as much as the carrot. In North India, beyond the world of violent political entrepreneurs 
and enforcers “the protection offered to your own victims” (Vidal et al., 2003:20) is also a 
well-rehearsed mode of gaining control and maintaining obedience across a variety of sectors 
of social life. Protection is indeed often a “shadowy contract” (Strathern, 2012:401) in which 
violence, personal interests and fantasies of power intersect.  
 Thankur Dabang and Gurbhachan Singh both derive a significant degree of their power 
from membership in large and cohesive dominant sub-castes that are able to deliver blocks of 
votes to whatever party they happen to support. However, their political dominance is no longer 
based on the traditional territorial dominance of the type once described by M. N. Srinavas. In 
rural areas, dominant landowning castes no longer directly control the livelihoods of lower-
caste labourers because of the growing availability of off-farm work (see Jodhka, 2014). Nev-
ertheless traditional dominant castes like the Yadavs and the Jats have managed to reproduce 
their power through politics and state employment (see Jeffrey, 2001; Breman, 2007). Jats in 
Punjab became involved in politics through farmer unions, as well as through the Jat-dominated 
Shiromani Akali Dal, and Yadavs in UP have captured a share of power by uniting under the 
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banner of the Samajwadi Party (SP). Both groups have also invested in education in order to 
obtain jobs in the police, as well as in a variety of different state departments. 
 
“Competitive Mafia Raj”, “monopolistic Mafia Raj” and machine politics  
The ethnography that will follow in the next section illustrates how the openness with which 
violent protectors can operate, and how they are incorporated into political parties, relates to 
structures of inter- and intra-party competition. In Uttar Pradesh, multi-party competition cor-
relates with higher levels of communal and caste-based conflict (Wilkinson, 2004) and a higher 
number of criminal political candidates (Aidt et al., 2015) and produces a high demand for 
protection services. Moreover the need for muscle-power is at its peak in areas with deep com-
munity divides where voters desire forceful representatives who can credibly protect their 
group interests. It has been established that political parties select criminal candidates in those 
areas where social divisions are the most contested (Vaishnav, 2011). The case study of Uttar 
Pradesh shows how, in this environment, violent protectors operate in ways that respond to a 
genuine demand for protection against real threats. 
 On the other hand, the Punjab witnessed significant communal violence during the Kha-
listani militant period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, but stringent counter-insurgency 
measures subsequently rid the state of major communal tensions. Between 1987 and 1992, the 
Punjab was under president rule and became a quasi-militarised “Police Raj” (Singh, 
1996:411). By the mid-1990s Gurharpal Singh (1996:410) wrote that the Punjab provided a 
model of a government that had “successfully overcome the most difficult confrontations since 
independence”. However, he argues that pacification came at the cost of the emergence of an 
authoritarian state that brutalised both society and the civil administration.  
 In the post-insurgency period, we find that two-party competition correlates with more 
muted levels of communal and caste-based conflict, and hence we argue, with less demand for 
communal protection. This is because the ruling Shiromani Akali Dal in particular has realised 
that it needs to attract voters across communal and caste divides if it wishes to obtain a majority 
in government (Singh, 2014). In the absence of any significant demand for protection, we sug-
gest that in the Punjab protection is imposed and signals a more authoritarian political setup. 
 Our material also illustrates how intra-party competition, reflected in the unity or disu-
nity of a political party, affects the degree to which “protector/enforcers” can operate autono-
mously. The manner in which party machines incorporate “criminal elements” affects the ca-
pacity of the party to control and discipline. In the SP, there is a fusion between the party 
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organisation and its criminal elements; which prevents “the leadership from acting when some 
of the troops misbehave” (Verniers, 2014). Moreover Western UP’s ruling Samajwadi Party is 
loosely organised and its party workers enjoy far more freedom than do their counterparts in 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Its loose party structure 
and mercenary ideology characterised by what Mbembe (1992) calls the “politics of expedi-
ency”, combined with its incorporation of ambitious criminal elements, divides the SP into a 
number of competing power centres. This, we suggest, partly accounts for the anarchy that has 
characterised the SP’s tenure in government. Following defeat in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, 
the SP’s leadership recognised that the party’s lack of discipline was costing it votes. To rem-
edy this situation Akhilesh Yadav (the current UP chief minister) set up a school to train party 
cadres and to improve party discipline.11 However, party workers in both the Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which are the other two main parties in the 
state, appeared almost envious of the independence and autonomy of their SP counterparts who 
were given free reign to get rich and abuse their power. By contrast, when the BSP was in 
power (2007-2012), the “dirty work” was subcontracted to non-party workers. Mayawati (the 
former UP Chief Minister) didn’t formally incorporate “goondas” into her party and produce a 
regime in which “organised” and “centralised” corruption was visible but controlled. Maya-
wati’s elected strongmen were (and are) not part of the party organisation and are, hence, highly 
disposable. In addition, under the current SP rule, the police (and the DM) is under control of 
the local Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA). By contrast, during the BSP’s tenure, 
Mayawati kept full control of the state’s administration, in what has been described “a statist” 
party (Pai, 2007). Such direct tight control cut across local systems of bossism and dis-imbed-
ded the bureaucracy from localised patronage relations.  
 Similarly, the Punjab’s ruling Shiromani Akali Dal has a highly disciplined and cen-
tralised power structure, and the chief minister is widely held to control the party with an iron 
fist. SAD party workers closely monitored each other, sometimes also recording potentially 
subversive conversations on their mobile phones. Moreover, the SAD deployed CID plain-
clothes police officers to spy on people to check their political allegiances. Despite recent 
changes, the party is still united by religious ideology and by the cause of representing Sikh 
                                                          
11See http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/post-rout-akhilesh-plans-training-school-for-party-cadres/ 
(accessed on 20 April 2016).  
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interests both within and beyond the Punjab, and as such more closely resembles parties like 
the Shiv Sena (Hansen, 2001; Eckert, 2003). Finally, the party did not fully integrate “criminal” 
candidates in its party machine, and while it used henchmen like Gurbhachan Singh (see be-
low), these were easily disciplined and widely believed to be disposable.  
 
“Competitive Mafia Raj” in a teshil in Western Uttar Pradesh 
In Uttar Pradesh, the term “Mafia Raj” is particularly associated with the Samajwadi Party, a 
party often described as a party of “goondas” (gangsters). It is built around and draws its sup-
port principally from the Yadav community and is led by Mulayam Singh Yadav, a former 
wrestler. The Samajwadi Party has a reputation for protecting not only the interests of the 
Yadavs and Muslims—and more recently also of Rajputs—but of protecting “criminals”. The 
extraction of what is locally termed “goonda tax”—paid in money, votes and favours—in ex-
change for protection forms the backbone of the political careers of many party bosses. If you 
ask the common man on the street to describe what characterises “Mafia Raj”, he gives a simple 
and telling answer: “When the SP is in charge criminals are on the streets, they are able to 
operate and flourish—the Samajwadi Party protects ‘them’ and they get revenues from them—
it is all about ‘goonda tax’’ (protection money).” 
 In Western Uttar Pradesh the most powerful violent protectors are referred to as 
dabangs, and a number of them began their careers during the previous Samajwadi Party “Ma-
fia Raj”—between 2002 and 2007. However, many of them subsequently shifted allegiances 
because they needed to be with the party in power in order to obtain the political protection 
necessary to stay out of jail. Many dabangs have pending criminal cases against them, and they 
need effective contacts in Lucknow (the state capital) to slow down the court procedures in 
order to buy time. The term dabang entered the popular lexicon following the release of two 
films by that name in 2010 and 2012 and is now commonly used to refer to mafia-type leaders. 
Dabangs, unlike ordinary criminals (goondas), are political leaders and can instill both fear 
and respect. As an informant explained: “A Goonda is just a hired thug; to be a dabang you 
need to be charismatic, people need to give you influence, you need to stand out.” Crucially 
dabangs, or their close relatives, occupy political seats that afford them both prestige and a 
degree of state protection. Moreover, a typical dabang uses his/her own “crew” as bodyguards, 
travels in white 4x4s with red beacons and party flags, and flaunts his/her wealth and power 
with weapons, ostentatious gold jewellery, and large farmhouses on the outskirts of town. 
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 However, the principal characteristic of a dabang is that he/she specialises in racket-
eering. After land prices skyrocketed over the last 15 years, local violent political entrepreneurs 
extended their activities from mainly protecting traditional illicit activities, such as alcohol 
production/distribution, drug smuggling and contract killing, to dealing in property—increas-
ingly subject to illegal encroachment by kabza groups—and to real estate development.  
 To illustrate this, let us take the case of Thakur Dabang, a Rajput who is an unelected 
representative of the SP in a Western UP constituency where the SP possesses neither an MP 
(Member of Parliament), nor an MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly) seat. His resi-
dence is both the Samajwadi Party office and the headquarters of his own private “Dabang 
Thakur Company”. Local people use the terms “company”, “lobby”, “firm” or “mafia 
racket/cartel” (in Hindi English) and “parivar” (family) to refer to “organised criminal/political 
families” involved in the so-called sand, land, construction, hotel and oil “mafias”.  
 These are structured and permanent group of individuals who use violence to make 
profit through criminal activities and when they meet politics they become “mafias” (Armao, 
2015:3). Thakur Dabang’s Company is effectively the local representative of an alleged larger, 
state-wide, Yadav “family firm”, as the Samajwadi Party is often locally referred to. The terms 
“firm” and “company” are revealing because they clearly illustrate how public office and pri-
vate profit have become entwined. 
 In Western UP, different segments within the ruling party—in this case the SP—out-
source their business and political operations to companies such as Thakur Dabang’s, which 
are often composed of single clans and operate in a particular territory for varying spans of 
time. Thakurji possesses the local franchise of the SP, collecting “protection rents” and sending 
a cut to the centre. Crucially, his job as protector is to ensure that the police and the civil ad-
ministration do not crack down on illegal businesses and that they facilitate the operations of 
legal ones by helping them obtain licences and contracts. Officials in the civil administration 
and the police are compelled to cooperate because, if they do not, they risk being transferred 
to undesirable posts or even being suspended. In short, Thakur Dabang sells immunity.  
 Thakur Dabang is a Rajput and he also belongs to a circuit of protection linked to Raja 
Bhaia, the famous Samajwadi Rajput don from central UP—popularly known for feeding his 
enemies to crocodiles. “D.G.” is the second key character in the company and is related to the 
Yadav clan by kinship ties. The third key member of the party—who is the current SP district 
president—is not from the district, but Delhi. He is a property developer with friendship and 
kinship ties to the ruling Yadav clan. “The Company” is widely accused of making land grabs, 
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and a number of cases involving it have been brought to the attention of the local press and 
police. However, the police have taken no action against members of the company.  
 Take, for example, the case of Mr. S. Sharma—a retired teacher—whose house was 
forcibly occupied by a notorious local SP party aide. Mr. Sharma managed to file an FIR against 
the SP leader, but the police failed to take action and track down the accused. In the meantime, 
Mr. Sharma’s family received numerous threats from SP workers and lived, in his own words, 
“in absolute terror” for over two months. His ordeal only ended when he dropped the charges 
after SP workers threatened to kidnap his child. However, he lost his property. 
 
It is also an open secret that a number of SP municipality ward representatives are grabbing 
municipal land. The town mayor told us several times that she can do nothing about it because 
she does not have the support of the police and administration. As an old SP party worker said, 
“Akhilesh Yadav took charge as chief minister on the 15 March 2012 in the afternoon, and by 
dinner time local SP party workers were already grabbing land and properties…” (P. Yadav, 
SP party worker) 
 
While the SP cannot win a Lok Sabha seat in the constituency, its solid majority at state level 
means that its “contractors” in town are nevertheless in charge and have the power to protect 
illegal activities and collect protection rents. Regarding the “bhumi mafia”, a member of the 
Thukar Dabang company had the following to say: “You know how it is done, Luciaji. It’s 
very easy. You muscle up or pay a couple of people at the Nagar Palika office, beat up or kill 
the local Bhaia who thinks he deserves a share of the profits … then the land is all yours, it 
isn’t municipal land anymore, very easy. The most important thing for us (Indians) is land. 
People die for Land.” 
 The party also allegedly collects rents by helping supporters with disputes, police and 
court cases, and arranging bureaucratic transfers. As in the Punjab—see below—influence over 
the police is crucial in these everyday mediations in which people want police cases against 
them withdrawn, or in which they want to frame fake criminal charges against enemies. To 
secure its local influence over the police, the SP transferred all uncooperative superintendents 
of police out of the district. Over the past three years, eight superintendents of police have been 
transferred from the district. Equally revealing of SP control over the police is the fact that 
most SHOs at local police stations are members of the Yadav caste. To sum up, therefore, 
Thakur Dabang works not only with the direct protection and involvement of “the Yadav Com-
pany”, but it also works with the support of the police and of an equally politicised district 
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administration.12 In short, state officials sell protection just as much as criminals do.  
 However, Thakur Dabang Company does not have the monopoly over protection in the 
tehsil. He faces competition from other companies whose leaders have the backing of other SP 
patrons, as well as from emerging patrons in the BJP camp. One of the problems at the heart 
of the present “Uttar Pradesh Mafia Raj” is its instability due to the availability of multiple and 
often competing centres of protection within the SP. As one informant pointed out when com-
menting on the difference between the previous BSP regime under the chief minister Mayawati 
(a now famous Dalit leader) and the current SP regime: “You see … Mayawati was alone—
she has no family, no sons or daughters, no uncles! And she just took the money for herself 
and to build statues, but there are at least 20 relatives in Mulayam’s family who occupy elected 
state and national assembly seats—and hundreds of them at the local level, all of whom feel 
entitled to loot the state for as long as the SP stays in power” (Rattan Singh, 35 years old, milk 
seller). In fact, popular belief has it that UP is run by four-and-a-half chief ministers: Mulayam 
Singh Yadav (Akhilesh’s father), Ram Gopal Yadav and Shivpal Singh Yadav (Akhilesh’ s 
uncles), Azam Khan, and Akhilesh is the half.  
 There are at least four factions in the party in the district. There are six vice presidents 
and we counted at least ten city presidents (or former city presidents) in the month of April 
2014. It is, in fact, very difficult to figure out who yields influence locally within the SP organ-
isation as internal fights lead to frequent reconfigurations of power. There are few people in 
the town/district who can claim to be the “real” representatives of the “Yadav parivar”.  
 Information about who has the leadership’s favour is carefully distributed, or com-
pletely lacking. There are, for example, a number of local leaders who only came to know that 
they had been expelled from the SP through Facebook rumours. They never received confir-
mation of this from any member of Mulayam’s family and were kept in the dark about their 
fate for indefinite periods of time. These rumours, however, had the effect of discrediting them 
as leaders and protectors. Given that information has the potential to undermine a leader’s ef-
fectiveness, control over it is a prerequisite for power. Overall competing power centres and a 
                                                          
12  A parallel story of transfers and promotions is also present at the DM (District Magistrate Office) level. 
There have been seven DMs in the tehsil over the past two years. The patwari is also a key figure that “the 
company” needs to have on board for registering grabbed land. He is a Yadav, too.  
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lack of information create a great deal of insecurity and an absence of trust among the members 
of the public who often do not know where to go for protection. As Gambetta (1993) argues, 
lack of trust in a context where the state is unable to provide basic security generates the popular 
demand for Mafia-like protection.  
 Spending time at Thakur Dabang’s office provided insights into routine forms of intim-
idation, and to catch glimpses of how leaders sought to orchestrate riots and planned retaliations 
and assaults against enemies. The following describes some of the events witnessed at Thakur 
Dabang Company’s office one morning during a routine “Darbar” (public “court” meeting). 
While we waited in the office a petitioner from the local neighbourhood arrived. He had a 
problem with property borders. Satish Yadav (Thakur Dabang’s aide) gave him the telephone 
number of a person who could help him. Then he said, “Go kick him badly (eklat marla) and 
then tell him to call me.” The man said, “Yes—I shall do it … but can I also have some Sa-
majwadi Party’s headed paper?” People often ask for SP headed paper because it is believed to 
give credibility. If you have SP headed paper it means that you are closer to the “circuit of 
protection” and your threat of violence gains more credibility. 
 At this point another wealthy and upper-caste looking “client” arrived and began to talk 
about his problem immediately and without introduction. He wanted to avoid criminal 
charges—for a crime whose nature was not specified at the time—and came to complain about 
how the police officer in charge of the investigation wanted more than the Rs 50,000 he had 
previously agreed to take in order to get him off the hook. Thakur Dabang said, “How is it 
possible that that police officer is daring to ask you so for much money?” At that point, a pujari 
who was in the room distributing Prasad to people in there said, “If the police officer does not 
do what you asked, break his bones! (sarle ka taung tod dena).” Thakur Dabang responded 
gravely that there would be no need for violence. He said, “Just mention my name. It will be 
enough.” And then repeated it, “Just give my name.” 
 What we describe above illustrates how politicians routinely undermine the rule of law. 
Party bosses protected people involved in both legal and illegal activities, a practice inter-
changeably referred to as “sewa” (social work) or “goondagardi” (criminal work). The SP party 
name and its “goonda” credentials are consistently used to extort favours. Sometimes merely 
having a Yadav name or dropping the name of a particular leader lends credibility to an act of 
intimidation. Importantly, an enforcer can merely issue threats without having to act upon 
them. As Bola Bhaia (the neighbourhood local dabang) told me, “After all it is not what you 
do and how criminal and violent you are. What counts is what people believe you are capable 
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of protecting. It is people who make you a dabang not the other way around.” Later that same 
day in Thakur Dabang’s headquarters some party workers came to ask Thakur Dabang whether 
they should intensify their election campaign in X Tehsil. Oddly enough Thakur Dabang told 
them not to, and the party workers looked puzzled given that only a few weeks remained until 
polling. Why Thakur Dabang was not campaigning only became clear to me a couple of weeks 
later when someone at the company told me it was no use spending money on elections when 
your party stood no chance of winning. He said, “You keep the money allocated for the election 
campaign and you make more money by selling votes from your protected areas to the two 
main contending candidates. This is a business strategy. Since last August after the riots it was 
clear that BJP was taking over UP.”  
 Others have alleged that Thakur Dabang was already moving his own company under 
the protection of the BJP (he used to be with the BJP, although actually he has moved across 
all available parties over the past 20 years). The dabangs’ relation with “the Yadav Parivar” is 
volatile and their loyalty unpredictable, particularly when approaching elections herald a shift 
in power at the provincial level. At such moments, dabangs will often deliver votes from their 
protected areas to whatever party they believe might come to power. In order to do this, they 
both threaten and cajole voters and bribe and intimidate booth-level and police officers in order 
to try and rig elections. This is particularly true of village council (panchayat), block samiti13 
and municipal elections during which the highly politicised provincial administration runs elec-
tions.  
 Dabangs keep votes captive through local vote contractors, musclemen who are often 
village councillors (sarpanch) or municipal councillors in town and who have detailed 
knowledge of voting patterns at their local polling booths. Importantly the “vote contractors” 
often wield authority in Khap Panchayats—informal bodies that adjudicate caste disputes14—
and use the threat of ostracism to ensure that people vote according to their dictates. We have 
                                                          
13  The block samiti is the level above the village council and below district level, and a block is 
usually comprised of a number of villages. 
14  Informal caste panchayats are to be distinguished from formal panchayats, which are a for-
mal part of the Indian state. 
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been told that this threat is even more effective than that of physical punishment. As in the 
Punjab (see below), vote contractors can find out who people voted for through rumours and 
by analysing booth-wise polling results. This leads to what Stokes (2005:315) calls perverse 
accountability, a phenomenon whereby voters can be held accountable and punished for voting 
for the “wrong” party.15 
 Moreover, contractors who fail to deliver are themselves often punished. In the previous 
district council (Zila Parishad) elections, we met a contractor who had failed to deliver and 
was, as a consequence, beaten up so badly that he was hospitalised and had to walk with 
crutches for months thereafter. On another occasion, while we waited to meet a local dabang, 
we saw party workers planning an attack on a vote contractor who was flirting with two polit-
ical parties at the same time. Subsequently, the man and three of his aides ended up hospital-
ised. This shows again how the relation between political bosses and their musclemen is not 
straightforward (cf. Gayer, 2014) in a competitive environment and does not follow conven-
tional, more stable forms of patron–client relations.  
 
“Monopolistic Mafia Raj” in a tehsil in the Punjab 
The Punjabi context presents some stark contrasts with that of UP. Here, the number of MLAs 
with criminal records is 17% instead of 35%.16 Moreover, among those MLAs with criminal 
records only 4% have serious pending criminal cases, as opposed to 19% in UP. It is only 
recently, long after the term gained currency in Bihar and UP, that the term “Mafia Raj” has 
become common in Punjabi media. The “Mafia Raj” in the Punjab bears the mark of the au-
thoritarian police state that emerged from the counter-insurgency period and lacks the more 
fragmented and dispersed attributes that characterise it in Uttar Pradesh. However, “Mafia Raj” 
in the Punjab is also closely associated with the Indian real estate boom. Moreover, the term 
“Mafia Raj” also appears to stick to one party in particular: The SAD, a party that much like 
the SP is dominated by a ‘martial’ community, the Jat Sikhs. Jat Sikh nationalists frequently 
claim that while the party was once ideologically driven and devoted to the cause of Punjabi 
                                                          
15  Anna Hazare’s anti-corruption movement has been campaigning to eliminate results by polling booth 
but political parties have opposed it, presumably because it does away with an important mechanism through 
which they can monitor voters. 
16  See http://adrindia.org/sites/default/files/Combined%20MLAs.pdf . 
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nationalism and the defence of the Sikh faith, it has now become a mercenary party whose 
leaders are mainly concerned with the expansion of their private businesses. Recently, both 
vernacular and English-language papers have described the “mafianisation” of Punjabi politics, 
but few scholars—with the notable exception of S. S. Gill (2013)—have paid any systematic 
attention to the issue.  
 The 2014 victory of four candidates from the Aam Admi Party (Common Man Party)—
a party with a strong anti-corruption agenda—in the Malwa region was widely seen as an in-
dictment of Akali “Mafia Raj”, racketeering, high-handedness and general arrogance. The 
press identified Akali protection of and involvement in the state’s flourishing drug trade, the 
artificially-created shortage of sand by a politically-connected “sand-mafia”, and the corrup-
tion and politicisation of the police—as well as of the broader administration—as the principal 
causes of popular discontent. The latter was of particular concern ever since the ruling party 
placed local police station heads (SHOs) under the direct control of MLAs. Also affecting the 
party’s popularity were the widespread allegations that the party leadership have forcefully 
acquired shares in a number of businesses in the state, ranging from media outlets to roadside 
dhabas (restaurants), and bus services to commercial property and industry. Businessmen who 
refuse to pay tribute to the party leadership and likewise refuse to pledge their political alle-
giance to it soon face bureaucratic hurdles that cause their businesses to shut down, and the 
police allegedly harass transporters whose business competes with that of the chief minister’s 
family. Here, too, we find that state officials are using their position to extort “protection” 
money from people. People who refuse to pay tribute find themselves harassed by the bureau-
cracy and by the police, and in some cases even physically intimidated by thugs, as in Western 
UP. A single family dominates the SAD, rather than a large extended clan, as in the case of the 
SP, and the reigns of power are clearly held in the hands of the chief minister, who runs a 
disciplined party machine (see Singh, 2013) manned by an army of party workers. While unlike 
in Uttar Pradesh politicians are not necessarily individuals with criminal records, the party does 
protect goondas. However, SAD rule in the Punjab resembles the previous rule of the Bahujan 
Samaj Party and of the Bharatiya Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh more closely than it does SP’s 
rule in that it firmly controls its goondas and party workers. Moreover the SAD appears to be 
more cohesive than the SP because it mobilises both party workers and voters on the basis of 
religious ideology. While Pritam Singh (2014) has recently noted that the SAD has shifted its 
discourse towards development and away from divisive communal issues in order to lure pre-
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dominantly urban Hindu voters, it is still common to hear lower-ranking party workers remind-
ing their Jat Sikh constituents of the sacrilege committed against the Golden Temple by the 
Congress Party under Indira Gandhi. This emotive issue gains the support of a number of Jat 
Sikhs, particularly among an older generation who often claim that they will vote for the SAD 
regardless of its performance for the sake of the Sikh faith and to oppose the Congress party. 
Further, while Akali party workers also sometimes shift their political allegiances, they seem 
less likely to do so than their Samajwadi Party counterparts because the Akalis are believed to 
punish defectors by harassing them and embroiling them in fake police charges. 
 Overall, our material indicates that political loyalties are clearer than in Western Uttar 
Pradesh. In Tehsil X, unlike in Western UP, everyone knows where the power really lies. The 
local MLA and cabinet minister, a man of immense wealth with family and business ties in 
North America and a family friend of the chief minister, is clearly in charge. People flock to 
his palatial home—stocked with a retinue of Mercedes cars and 4x4s—in order to attend daily 
court sessions over which he presides like a deity with the power to miraculously resolve seem-
ingly intractable problems with a single phone call. Surrounded by two personal assistants and 
several heavily armed policemen, he calls land record officers, policemen, electricity board 
officers and government doctors. Among other things, people obtain jobs, cripples obtain 
wheelchairs, school fees are waived, and police investigations are influenced in their favour. 
The minister works indefatigably to resolve people’s minutest problems. Whatever its failures, 
the local Akali leadership cannot be accused of being absent and not working for its supporters. 
In fact, the local minister appears omnipresent, an appearance clearly reinforced by the fact 
that framed pictures of him adorn the walls of all his party workers. 
 The party can, however, be accused of extreme partiality towards its supporters and of 
victimising its opponents. Anyone who needs administrative or police help is expected to sup-
port the SAD and to do so publicly by swearing their allegiance in Sikh temples (Gurudwara) 
and Hindu temples. While, unlike in the case of the SP workers described above, the MLA 
does not threaten his own supporters and the atmosphere at his headquarters is generally con-
vivial, he does threaten opponents and even commands party workers to thrash them. While 
we never saw this in person, people showed us videos of him issuing such commands on their 
mobile phones, and several Congressmen told us that he had ordered party workers to attack 
them.  
 He forced several Hindu brick-kiln owners in the tehsil headquarters of X to join the 
Akalis by threatening them with police and bureaucratic harassment for illegally using tractors 
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to transport their bricks. Akali brick-kiln owners who transported their bricks just as illegally 
had nothing to worry about; they were protected, just as a number of party workers involved in 
the lucrative illegal trade in opiates were. We were also told that having been forced to join the 
party, they were subsequently expected to provide it with funds in the form of donations to the 
local MLA. In rural areas, where Akalis dominated, wealthy Congressite Jats who controlled 
vote banks and who owned shellers (for husking and cleaning paddy) risked having their li-
cences revoked, or, as we observed in one instance, not being allotted their due share of paddy 
for processing. These were all clear-cut cases of racketeering in which protection was granted 
in exchange for political loyalty and money. 
 The fact that the Akali government had given local politicians control over the local 
SHO made it easier than ever for party workers to intimidate voters and to file spurious FIRs 
against rivals and those who supported them. Throughout the countryside, Akali village coun-
cillors used their power to victimise opponents, filing fabricated or specious charges against 
village rivals; charges included illegally encroaching on village common spaces and lands, 
binding labourers through debt, committing an offence under the India Atrocities Act against 
a member of the Scheduled Castes, and even rape. Most frequently sarpanches used their 
power to secure control over grant money and village common lands and deny their opponents 
access to these. In a number of cases, they were also instrumental in rigging panchayat and 
block samiti elections with the collusion of the police.  
 As elsewhere throughout the Punjab, it was a Youth Akal Dal leader who led the party’s 
shock troops in Tehsil X. The local minister used him to organise rallies, rig local elections, 
and thrash rivals and, in exchange, shielded him from the police and allowed him to forcefully 
grab disputed properties, run gambling dens, traffic drugs, and forcefully settle personal scores. 
While Gurbachan himself was protected, he too sold protection services to people whose prop-
erties were disputed, but he was known to have turned against some of those who had hired 
him. One widow hired him to protect her against family members who were trying to get con-
trol over her property. Gurbachan managed to scare off the relatives, but subsequently turned 
on the widow and threatened her into signing her most valuable residential property over to 
him.  
 Lawyers in the divisional courts told us that despite his crimes, Gurbachan Singh had 
no pending cases against him. However, they also indicated that he was only able to act thanks 
to the support of the local MLA, and that the day the MLA decided that he was too much of a 
liability he would probably land in jail as other Youth Akali Dal toughs had in the past. Since 
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he depended on the MLA’s support, Gurbachan could not do whatever he pleased and had 
already been significantly reigned in by 2013. Prior to this, he was known to have randomly 
beaten up people in the streets for the mere fact of daring to look at him. However, the MLA 
only reined him in after Hindu traders came to complain about how Gurbachan had threatened 
one of them at gunpoint because of a relatively minor argument. 
 In our Punjab tehsil then, goondas were more clearly controlled than their counterparts 
in Western UP. Moreover, unlike in UP where it was not clear which goonda had party support, 
people knew exactly who had party support and who did not. It was well known that Gurbachan 
was the main goonda in Tehsil X. Unlike the dabangs in Uttar Pradesh, however, no-one 
thought it likely that he would ever become an MLA or an MP. Media attention on crime and 
corruption meant that Akali politicians needed to appear clean and a tainted record was a lia-
bility. Further, perhaps the predominance of wealthy established Jats with family ties and busi-
ness interests abroad within the party meant that, unlike in Uttar Pradesh, where members of 
lower and intermediate castes had risen to power, more genteel forms of respectability held 
sway.  
 The brother of the local MLA was, for example, repeatedly refused a party ticket be-
cause of his bad reputation as the patron of local toughs. While the party clearly needed him 
and allowed him to wield power unofficially, they did not want him in the limelight. For the 
most part, the party sought to keep its criminal activities hidden and used people without offi-
cial positions—like the local MLA’s younger brother—or lower-ranking workers like Gur-
bachan to do its dirty work. 
 Gurbachan Singh was a Jat Sikh from a village a couple of miles from X and had caught 
the local MLA’s attention because he belonged to a large and politically active extended kin-
ship group of Akali “refugees”—Jat Sikhs who migrated from West Punjab at Partition—and 
because of his forceful reputation and willingness to do the party’s dirty work. The extended 
kinship group, united through ties of descent and affinity, included block samiti members and 
ex-chairmen, market committee members, co-operative society presidents, sarpanches, Shi-
romani Gurudwara Prabandak Committee (SGPC)17 members, and, crucially, the personal as-
sistant of the local MLA. The latter was the son of a powerful party worker who was widely 
known for protecting drug traffickers and distillers from the police in exchange for votes, and 
                                                          
17  The SGPC manages Sikh Gurudwaras and its their significant revenues. 
22 
occasionally for money. United, this large group was able to deliver a large number of votes to 
the local MLA and received significant political patronage in exchange.  
 As in Western Uttar Pradesh kinship was clearly central to political mobilisation and 
organisation. However, unlike in Western Uttar Pradesh where the term “company” showed 
how public and private interests were openly merged, the refugees merely referred to them-
selves as a “group” and described themselves as public servants (sevadars). This indicates that 
corruption and crime could not be flaunted as openly as they were in Western Uttar Pradesh. 
Displays of force were also somewhat more muted than in Uttar Pradesh, and when party work-
ers like Gurbachan overdid things they were reigned in. On the other hand, party workers did 
flaunt their influence, contacts and wealth as these allowed them to be perceived as effective 
politicians and thereby garner votes. Poor politicians lacking these assets were widely per-
ceived as unable to do people’s work (logon ka kaam). 
 Gurbachan Singh started his political career during his college days when he was a 
kabaddi player. During those days he proved his worth in several fights against rival student 
groups and eventually defeated rival contenders to student union leadership. People who knew 
him from his college days told me he was always getting into fights. However, the feat that 
permanently established him as the biggest goonda in X was his capture and subsequent sale 
of the abovementioned widow’s urban property. Like the dabangs in Western UP, Gurbachan 
was involved in property dealing and specialised not only in selling protection to people whose 
properties were disputed, but also in the sale and purchase of disputed properties. Most com-
monly disputes arise when a tenant who has possession over a property refuses to pay rent 
and/or vacate it. Because of laws protecting tenants, it is difficult—and in some cases even 
impossible—to evict them. People like Gurbachan help people evict and threaten wayward 
tenants for a fee, but also help prevent the illegal encroachment of people’s property. Addition-
ally, property speculators like Gurbachan also buy disputed properties for a third of their value, 
sort out the dispute with money and/or force, and then sell them off for their full value.  
 While Gurbachan’s notorious feats were widely discussed, other Akali party workers, 
including close relatives of his, also used their influence to take control of communal property 
both in town and in the villages. Upon gaining office the mayor of X sold significant amounts 
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of urban property to associates in the SAD,18 and allowed some of Gurbachan’s relatives to 
grab some shops in the centre of town where they set up fertiliser and commission agent busi-
nesses. In villages, where most of the fieldwork was conducted, the most common land grab 
was of village commons (shamlaat zameen), which like all other land had become a coveted 
asset.  
 Gurbachan’s ties with the authorities and his role as a “vote contractor” became clear 
when we saw him and several young men—mostly relatives from his own village and neigh-
bouring ones—capturing the polling station in his home village of Mial Khurd during the block 
samiti elections of 2013. The event and what happened subsequently clearly illustrate how the 
Akalis could forcefully extract tribute in the form of votes and how they unleashed the full 
force of the state against those who refused to pay it. On that day Gurbachan and his men had 
denied the opposition Congressites entry into the polling station, and when I reached the village 
the latter were amassed a hundred or so metres away from it shouting “Death to the Akali Dal!” 
(Akali Dal Murdabad). Inside the polling station, Gurbachan and his brothers were feeding the 
polling officers large plates of rich food—flat-breads soaked in clarified butter, an assortment 
of curried vegetables and lentils, pickles and large metal tumblers filled with cool yoghurt drink 
(lassi). The previous night I had seen members of Gurbachan’s extended family offering poll-
ing officers and policemen bottles of whisky at three polling stations. The officers had ac-
cepted, although some had at first weakly refused in order not to look greedy. 
 Just after the officers had eaten, the Congressites decided to take on the Akalis. The 
latter, who were more numerous and had swords and metal rods ready at hand, got the upper 
hand and beat the Congressites so badly that they sent two of them to hospital. The ten or so 
police officers present at the polling station did nothing to stop them. That night PTC news 
channel—owned by the chief minister’s family—broadcast Gurbachan’s version of events and 
claimed that the Congressites had tried to disrupt otherwise peaceful elections. The local Con-
gress leader, Sukhvinder Singh, claimed to have called several reporters but that none had 
wanted to report on actual events because they were scared of retribution by the ruling party. 
                                                          
18  Opposition Congress town councillors told me that by doing this the mayor had effectively deprived the 
town of an important source of income. Prior to this, the municipal council had an income of some 70 lakhs, 
whereas it currently has an income of only 40 lakhs, which is not enough to cover the 65 lakhs required annually 
to even meet the costs of running the municipality. 
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He claimed that in most cases people did not even bother to contact reporters because they 
were either ignorant, or too scared to antagonise the Akalis, or simply because they had no faith 
in reporters who were believed to be in the pay of politicians or, in the best of cases, took 
money to write stories.19 
 Worse still, the Akalis placed charges for attempted murder against him and 11  Con-
gressites, including those who had been hospitalised. Gurbachan used these to force the Con-
gress leaders to step down in the forthcoming panchayat elections and allow him to become 
village sarpanch unopposed, without having to actually contest the elections. Sukhvinder 
Singh—who had close ties with the Punjab Congress leadership and was well informed about 
his party’s standing—lamented how so many members of his party were stepping down and 
allowing Akalis to take over because they were afraid.  
 What happened to him and his close associates illustrates the fate of those who did not 
step down. When the Akalis had come to power for a second consecutive term, Gurbachan 
Singh had decided to teach Sukhvinder and his family a lesson. Gurbachan and his family were 
irked by Sukhvinder’s political influence, and by the fact that it had made him Block Samiti 
Chairman during the last Congress government. They were also jealous about the fact that he 
had greatly prospered over the years by transforming 40 acres of jungle into fertile irrigated 
land. Sukhvinder’s son told me they hated the fact that his father had been the first to build a 
large new house, and that he had been sent to an exclusive, elite school in Nabha. He claimed 
that Gurbachan’s family—which he described as a bunch of illiterates (unparh log)—were 
constantly using black magic against him, and he alleged that Gurbachan had tried to destroy 
his family by getting his younger brother addicted to heroin. While not wanting to show that 
Gurbachan had in any way been successful, he admitted that the younger brother’s drug addic-
tion was a constant source of tension in the family. The brother did not work, spent lots of 
money on his addiction, and constantly fought with him and his parents. 
 Animosities reached a peak after the Akalis returned to power in 2012. One day, while 
the chairman’s son was out in the fields supervising his labourers, 12 young men armed with 
iron rods and rifles assaulted him. His father, who was at home, saw what was happening, took 
                                                          
19  While both the Punjabi- and English-language press underreported the extent of rigging, they did nev-
ertheless report several cases. 
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out his rifle, and fired several shots into the air. Upon hearing the shots the attackers all ran 
away and subsequently went on to the police station to file charges for attempted murder 
against him and his father. Because the case against them was registered in the evening they 
were unable to obtain bail and had to spend one night in jail. Moreover the police, serving the 
interests of the Akalis, refused to register the chairman’s case against the attackers. Fortunately, 
the sub-divisional judge rejected the Akali case and all charges were dropped. The chairman 
told us that while the judiciary was corrupt and inefficient it remained a largely independent 
institution, unlike the police. 
 Sukhvinder boasted that most other Congress party workers were not as fearless as he 
was. In another nearby village, Gurbachan had threatened an SC Congress candidate for the 
block samiti elections, telling him that if he did any campaigning he would beat him up. Like 
other Congress candidates throughout the Punjab, he had bowed down to the pressure although 
he had not shifted his allegiance over to the Akalis, unlike his associates who had been asked 
to pledge their allegiance to the party in the village Gurudwara. Like in other villages we vis-
ited, they had shifted over because they feared having fake police charges placed against them 
if they did not. Their fear was well founded, since one Congressman in their village had been 
falsely implicated in a rape case, and in another village a Ramdasia SC told me that he had 
been falsely implicated in a village brawl where he was not even present because he had refused 
to pledge his allegiance to the Akalis in the village the Gurudwara. In this latter village, the 
Akalis had made SC access to housing plots contingent upon them swearing allegiance to the 
party, and to the sarpanch who represented it locally. Those who did not do this were denied 
housing plots, and those who led them—like the above SC—were implicated in fake police 
charges. 
 Gurbachan and his allies also appear to have managed to get the police to rig panchayat 
elections for them in Mial Kalan Khurd (a twin village next to Mial Khurd). The Congress 
chairman told me that in this case the police did the rigging, rather than Gurbachan and his 
toughs, because his faction in the village was the more numerous one and would have been 
difficult to overcome. In fact, members of the chairman’s faction all claim that their candidate 
obtained 309 votes, while the Akali candidate only obtained 70. However, the MLA’s younger 
brother had promised to hand the village council over to the latter by hook or by crook, so he 
sent in the police and ensured his win. The Congressites’ claim that their party had a strong 
lead is vindicated by the fact that four out of five council members (panches) elected in the 
village were from their party; this vindicates their claim because no-one votes for panches from 
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one party and for a sarpanch from another. In other words the Congress’ four panches are 
evidence that the Congress candidate for sarpanch did, in fact, have the lead. Subsequently, 
while the Akali candidate did not obtain the quorum necessary to run the panchayat, it never-
theless appears that the local MLA gave him grants for village development. The chairman is 
nevertheless confident that as a result of the blatant rigging that took place in the village even 
loyal Akalis would reconsider their allegiance to the party.  
 
Conclusions 
While close ties between the political, business and criminal spheres are by no means new to 
India—nor to the rest of the world—our informants across the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh agree 
that these spheres are becoming increasingly intertwined and forming “Mafia Raj”. Scholarly 
work on Indian politics likewise indicates that this is the case. In the Punjabi context, S. S. Gill 
(2014) has recently argued that business and politics are now more closely tied than they ever 
have been, while Jaffrelot and Kumar’s (2009) longitudinal study of MLA profiles has demon-
strated similar trends in the context of Uttar Pradesh. Both government officials and strongmen 
are providing illegal protection services and are doing so in response to a growing demand for 
protection produced by a violent scramble for valued economic assets.  
 In theory at least, the illegal market for protection is the preserve of groups operating 
on the margins or outside the state, while the legal market for protection is meant to be the 
preserve and monopoly of sovereign states. This paper shows how in two sites across North 
India this distinction collapsed, and illustrates how formal state agents, including elected and 
non-elected political leaders and the police, are increasingly involved, either directly or indi-
rectly, in protecting illegal activities. At first glance the distinction appears to be more blurred 
in Western Uttar Pradesh where the Samajwadi Party openly admits bosses with “criminal” 
backgrounds than in the Punjab where the Shiromani Akali Dal subcontracts “goondagardi” 
(criminal work) to lower ranking party workers. However, a focus on “protection/extortion” 
makes it clear that both the SAD and the SP developed symbiotic relations with the state in 
order to run their economic and political activities (both the legal and the illegal ones). The 
nature of the party machines in question, and their capacity to monopolise violence shape “var-
ious types of interaction between political actors and violent entrepreneurs as well as various 
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modes of penetration of organised criminal violence within the political arena….”20 Indeed, 
they produced different configurations of “mafia-owned democracy”: a “competitive Mafia 
Raj” in Western Uttar Pradesh and “monopolistic Mafia Raj” in Punjab.21 
 The difference is that in the Punjab leaders can somewhat more credibly distance them-
selves from the henchmen within their parties’ ranks. This is a useful reminder that illegal and 
para-legal activities in India are not the sole preserve of local vernacular forces, and also allows 
us to move away from narratives according to which criminal politics is the preserve of India’s 
more overtly lawless and backwards districts, or of the vernacular forces of political society 
(Chatterjee, 2004). 
 We have also suggested that structures of inter- and intra-party competition can help 
explain how the demand and the imposition for protection are structured. We saw how, in 
Western Uttar Pradesh, multi-party competition—coinciding with communal and caste-based 
divides—contributed to produce highly violent forms of bossism and volatile environments. 
Intra-party competition arising from the SP’s loose party structure and its integration of mus-
cular bosses within the party’s ranks further generated popular demand for protection by giving 
rise to insecurity. Furthermore, competing strongmen, both across parties and within the SP, 
vying for control over protection mean that people in Western UP are not only subject to the 
predatory activities of various contending bosses, but are also unable to determine who they 
need to approach if they need mediation with the authorities. As one informant said, “Nowa-
days people don’t know whom they have to pay or whom they have to beat up in order to get 
things done: this is the Junglee Raj” (Rakesh, 35 years old, Jat, businessman). Revealingly, 
people do not criticise dabangs for being criminal and violent, but for the fact that they are 
unable to effectively provide the basic security that rulers are expected to. It is perhaps worth 
remembering here that a key duty of traditional kings is to maintain order (dharma) through 
the threat of violence and punishment (danditi). The king should inspire terror in order to deter 
                                                          
20  Briquet and Fararel-Garrigues (2010:2). 
21  In a similar fashion Armao characterises Italy as a consociational “mafia-owned democracy”: a regime 
based on cooperation between mafiosi, politicians and entrepreneurs. By contrast Mexican democracy is concep-
tualised as centrifugal “mafia-owned democracy” and characterised by strongly competitive behaviours between 
the various leaders involved and a much greater degree of violence compared to the Italian situation.  
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disruptive forces and thereby allow his subjects to live peacefully and to practice ahimsa. How-
ever, as is often repeated in Western UP, “People have no fear.” This is what we choose to call 
a “competitive Mafia Raj”.  
 On the other hand, in the Punjabi tehsil of X, the sense of insecurity is less pronounced 
because communal tensions within the Punjab have subsided, and electoral competition is 
largely restricted to two dominant parties that are increasingly reaching across communal and 
caste divides. It is also less pronounced because the SAD leadership is firmly in control of its 
operatives, and for the most part the only goondas allowed to operate are the ones that clearly 
serve its interests. Additionally, the activities of these goondas are set within strict limits and 
when they overstep these they are reigned in—as Gurbachan was following the incident in 
which he threatened a goldsmith at gunpoint. Furthermore, people know exactly where to go if 
they need assistance for police or bureaucratic matters. Here, the main victims of insecurity are 
members of the opposition and—like everywhere else in the world—the poor who lack politi-
cal contacts and influence. Thus, in the Punjab, the only significant threat to citizens is the one 
produced by the ruling party, which happens to also provide the shield against this threat to 
those who pledge their loyalty and provide it with funds. Here, people do not complain so much 
about disorder as they do about dictatorship and frequently state that there is no democracy in 
the Punjab. We choose to call this a “monopolistic Mafia Raj”.  
 We suggest that a “competitive Mafia Raj” allows for a transition from “criminal bro-
ker”/“goon” to “criminal politician” (the dabang) and thus potentially to greater levels of social 
mobility. By contrast, a “monopolistic Mafia Raj” generates less insecurity but is less amenable 
to newcomers entering the political fray and rising up the political hierarchy. This is apparent 
from the fact that most high-ranking politicians in the Punjab belong to very wealthy and upper-
caste families and that the Scheduled Castes, despite forming a larger percentage of the popu-
lation than any other group, have played only a marginal role in the state’s politics. On the 
other hand, while UP’s “competitive Mafia Raj” generates considerable insecurity, it allows 
forceful political entrepreneurs who do not belong to the traditional establishment to become 
MLAs and MPs and to, therefore, destabilise established power structures and patron–client 
ties. Overall, we hope to have shown that a grounded ethnographic description of pockets of 
“mafia-owned democracies” can help to construct systematic comparisons of different areas 
and generate a productive framework through which to refine empirically the concept of “ma-
fia-owned democracy” within South Asia and beyond.  
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